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Risk, reward, and the rewriting of Devens’ history

When Fort Devens closed in the 1990s, what remained was not an obvious asset. It was a liability—environmentally compromised, infrastructurally strained, and economically uncertain. The land carried the weight of contamination and the possibility that redevelopment might fail.

At that moment, surrounding towns faced a choice: Assume financial responsibility for this uncertain future, or step aside.They stepped aside.

The commonwealth did not. Through public financing, Massachusetts committed $200 million in bonding capacity to reclaim Devens—rebuilding infrastructure and assembling conditions necessary for private investment. It was not a guaranteed success. It was a long-term wager on renewal.

The families who chose to buy homes in Devens also made a profound financial commitment. They invested in property in a place still proving its future. They wagered what is most people’s biggest asset: their homes.

Those wagers paid off.

Today, Devens stands as one of the commonwealth’s most successful redevelopment efforts: a center of industry, innovation, and employment. Its success is the direct result of risk-taking, sustained investment, and a willingness to act when others would not.

And now, when Devens has become something of value, certain towns seek to reassert jurisdiction.

Basic economic theory rests on a simple principle: reward follows risk. Those who invest when the outcome is uncertain—who commit capital and endure the long horizon of development—earn the right to benefit when that investment succeeds.

The towns have not collected taxes from Devens since 1917, when the land was little more than farmland. Its present value was created—deliberately and at risk—by the commonwealth and homeowners. Why should the towns now begin to collect positive cash flow when they invested nothing?

Devens is what it is today because Massachusetts and homeowners chose to invest when others declined. That decision required foresight and public commitment. It deserves to be recognized—not revised.

The question before us is not simply who governs Devens. It is whether we remember how it became worth governing at all.

In this case, the answer is clear: The commonwealth and the homeowners took the risk.

Laura Scott
Elm Street, Devens

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